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The Mereology of Digital Copyright* 
Dan L. Burk† 
INTRODUCTION 
The development of the Internet as a means of communication 
has facilitated widespread access to a vast array of digitized works 
in a variety of electronic formats.1  Increased access to such 
digitized works has heightened the need for robust systems that can 
identify and index online resources in order to allow users to locate 
and access the new wealth of digitized materials in what amounts 
to a global virtual library.2  Cataloging and indexing has always 
been critical to library functions, but never more so than in the 
decentralized, emergent library that constitutes the Internet.3  
Consequently, search engines such as the Google4 database have 
developed into key tools for facilitating access to online resources; 
 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2735.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
* Copyright 2007–08 by Dan L. Burk 
† Dan L. Burk holds the Oppenheimer, Wolf and Donnelly Professorship at the 
University of Minnesota Law School, where he teaches courses in Patent, Copyright, and 
related topics.  Professor Burk holds a B.S. (1985) in Microbiology from Brigham Young 
University, an M.S. (1987) in Molecular Biology and Biochemistry from Northwestern 
University, a J.D. (1990) from Arizona State University, and a J.S.M. (1994) from 
Stanford University. 
 1 See Paula Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable 
Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
49, 108 n.246 (1993). 
 2 See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine 
Utopianism, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 188, 189 (2006). 
 3 See Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of 
Search Engines Matters, 16 INFO. SOC’Y 169, 170 (2000). 
 4 Google Home Page, http://www.google.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). 
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if the resource is not indexed via such a database, it effectively 
ceases to exist.5 
Such control over access to digital resources implicates control 
over the use and disposition of those resources.6  Information 
cannot be used until it is found.  In the physical world, control of 
information has been incident to physical or legal ownership that 
determines access or exclusion.  Works of creative authorship have 
long been subject to ownership under the rubric of copyright law, 
which offers certain defined exclusive rights as an incentive for 
creation and publication of expressive works.7  However, the 
copyright system that developed in a world of hardcopy print is 
challenged both by the technology of digitization and by the 
construction of metadata indexes for digitized works.8  Rules of 
ownership developed to control access to atoms apply only 
uncertainly when used to control access to bits.9 
The troubled interplay between copyright and digital 
expression is nowhere more apparent than in the controversial 
Google Book Search10 project, where search engine technology 
intersects with indexed databases scanned into electronic format 
from hardcopy materials.11  In this Article, I analyze the copyright 
status of this project, using it as a vehicle to develop certain themes 
that are emerging as fundamental issues in the copyright of 
digitized texts.  I begin by describing the Google Book Search 
project, touching briefly upon the legal rationale relied upon by 
Google for scanning copyrighted works into its database without 
permission of the copyright holders.  I then move to the issue that 
has received less attention: the copyright status of the metadata 
relational database that is core of the project.  This database, I 
argue, is emblematic of the broader issues facing copyright in an 
age of digitization, and I discuss several cases that bear upon the 
 
 5 See Introna, supra note 3, at 171. 
 6 See id. at 169–75. 
 7 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2000). 
 8 See Emily Anne Proskine, Google’s Technicolor Dreamcoat: A Copyright Analysis 
of the Google Book Search Library Project, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 213 (2006). 
 9 See id. 
 10 Google Book Search, http://books.google.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). 
 11 About Google Books, http://books.google.com/intl/en/googlebooks/about.html (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2008). 
BURK_022508_FINAL 2/25/2008  7:20:03 PM 
2008] THE MEREOLOGY OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 713 
legal status of such a meta-database.  I conclude by sketching the 
challenges that copyright law will need to encompass as works of 
authorship move from fixation as atoms to recordation as bits. 
THE GOOGLE BOOK PROJECT 
The Google Book Search project is an ambitious—even 
audacious—attempt to make available via the Internet a searchable 
database of texts previously available only as bound, printed 
matter.12  The project uses Google search engine technology as the 
technical vehicle to provide storage, indexing, and retrieval of texts 
that have been scanned from printed format to digital format.13  
But the scanning process requires access to the physical printed 
texts.  This has been accomplished via two complementary 
initiatives.14  The first of these initiatives is the relatively 
straightforward “publisher program.”15  In this component of their 
overall strategy, Google seeks the cooperation and permission of 
publishers for inclusion of books in the database, and many 
publishers see value in participating.  Publishers in this part of the 
program provide copies of books to be scanned or, if available, 
they provide electronic files of book text, under terms agreed upon 
with the publisher.16  This portion of the overall Google agenda is 
relatively uncontroversial; scanning and inclusion of books within 
this portion of the database is done with permission and approval 
of the publishers, who generally hold the copyright, and who can 
set whatever terms of use they choose.17 
What has been more controversial is the library scanning 
portion of the Google effort.  In this portion of the project, Google 
 
 12 See Jonathan Band, The Google Print Library Project: Fair or Foul?, 9 J. INTERNET 
L. 1, 1 (2005). 
 13 See id. 
 14 See id. 
 15 Partner Program, https://books.google.com/partner/?hl=en_US (last visited Jan. 2, 
2008); see also Book Search Intro, http://books.google.com/intl/en-US/googlebooks/ 
book_search_tour/index.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). 
 16 Help Users Find Your Books, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/book_search_ 
tour/books2.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2008). 
 17 See Band, supra note 12. 
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has entered into agreements with several libraries,18 including 
those of Harvard University, the University of Michigan, the New 
York Public Library, and Oxford University, to gain access to and 
to scan all or part of the library’s holdings.19  The exact terms of 
the agreements are undisclosed and appear to differ from library to 
library, but it is clear that at least some of these agreements will 
result in scanning of books for which the library owns the physical 
volume, but for which the library does not have the right to make 
or authorize making of copies, including scanned digital copies.20 
In both portions of the project, book pages are scanned to 
produce high quality, but not archival quality, images.21  The 
scanned images are then parsed by Google search technology.22  At 
present, Google is keeping the original images stored, and has 
agreed to provide copies of the original images back to the library 
from which the book was scanned.23  But the stored images 
 
 18 Library Partners, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/partners.html (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2008). 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Can I see a copy of a contract you have with a library partner?, Google Book 
Search Help Center, http://books.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=43752& 
query=contracts (last visited Jan. 2, 2008); Suzanne Bresson Bis, Book Search Is 
Beautiful?: An Analysis of Whether Google Book Search Violates International 
Copyright Law, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 271, 281 (2007). 
 21 “If you look at what Google does, it’s really a bitonal representation.  It’s as if the 
book were brand new, which is just to say that the page is white [and] the ink for the font 
is black.  Whereas if you look at the Microsoft [Windows Live Book Search] 
presentation, it’s a color image, so you get the sense of it as an artifact.” Dian 
Schaffhauser, Google Book Search: The Good, the Bad, & the Ugly, Campus 
Technology, Jan. 1, 2008, at 7, available at http://www.campustechnology.com/ 
articles/57064 (quoting Linda Becker, Vice President, Marketing for Kirtas, a digitization 
technology solutions company).  Google has not released any specific information about 
the exact scanning system it uses for the Book Search project.  Its engineering director, 
Dan Clancy, has stated that the company developed its own scanning process rather than 
use a commercial scanning solution. Id. at 4–6. 
 22 The digitization process involves the parsing of the scanned image and converting 
that information into “other file formats for online viewing.” Id. at 7.  Therefore a user 
can “just enter the keyword or phrase . . . into the Google Book Search box” and Google 
will return “snippets—of [the] search term in context.” How does Google Book Search 
work?, Google Book Search Help Center, http://books.google.com/support/bin/ 
answer.py?answer=43724&topic=9259 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
 23 “[T]he library will get a digital copy of the book as a part of their collection.” 
Information for publishers and authors about the Library Project, 
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/publisher_library.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
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themselves are not the database from which users search or from 
which search results are returned.24  Rather, a relational database 
built up from the scanned images is the core of the project.  An 
index is built of each word in the scanned text and its relationship 
to nearby words.  This relational database is made available via a 
user interface on the Google website.25  When a user searches the 
database using keywords, a snippet of the text comprising the 
keyword sought and a certain number of surrounding words is 
returned.26  If a book is deemed to be in the public domain, the full 
text may be made available; if the book is still in copyright, the 
availability of text is restricted.27  Rather than providing full text 
access for most books in the library program, Google provides, 
along with the search results, links to bookstores or libraries where 
the physical book may be purchased or borrowed. 
Although access to the reconstructed text is parsimonious, the 
mere scanning of the books to produce the relational database has 
created a firestorm of controversy.28  The holdings of any of these 
libraries will certainly include both works currently protected by 
copyright and works for which the copyright has lapsed or 
expired.29  The latter type of work may of course be copied freely, 
but it will often be difficult to determine which category a 
particular work falls into.  Google has argued that obtaining 
permission to scan the books would be prohibitive—even 
determining whether permission is needed would be prohibitive.30  
Prior to 1978, copyright in the United States was granted for a term 
 
 24 As stated above, Google has disclosed little information about its search technology. 
See Schaffhauser, supra note 21.  I rely here in part on conversations with personnel at 
Google. 
 25 See How does Google Book Search work?, Google Book Search Help Center, 
http://books.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=43724&topic=9259 (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2008) 
 26 See id. 
 27 See Why can’t I read the entire book?, Google Book Search Help Center, 
http://books.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=43729&topic=9259 (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2008). 
 28 See Band, supra note 12, at 12. 
 29 See id. at 1. 
 30 See Proskine, supra note 8, at 219. 
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of years, with renewable extension.31  Some authors may have 
failed to renew the copyright for the extended term, in which case 
the work may have fallen into the public domain and may be 
copied freely—but it will often be difficult to determine whether a 
work was renewed.32  Additionally, since the early 1990s, U.S. 
copyright law has not required that a copyright notice be placed on 
published works.33  Prior to that time, publication of a work 
without notice automatically placed it into the public domain, so 
that lack of a notice signaled that the work could be freely 
copied.34  This is no longer a requirement for published works, so 
more recently published works that are protected by copyright may 
have no indication of who held the copyright when the work was 
published.35 
And, the complexity of determining a book’s copyright status 
does not end there.  Copyright may have been transferred to an 
entity other than the author or publisher; publishers may have gone 
out of business; authors may be deceased; the heirs of authors, who 
may or may not have inherited the copyright to the work, may be 
difficult or impossible to locate. Consequently, the cost of simply 
locating the copyright holders of many books, in order to obtain 
permission for their works to be scanned into the database, is 
potentially enormous.36  Naturally, if copyright holders for the 
books can be located, some may decline permission to scan the 
book, diminishing the usefulness of the resultant database with 
each permission denied.  But such refusals are a relatively simple 
and straightforward problem; it is equally likely that copyright 
owners, once located, could demand idiosyncratic fees or place 
restrictions on the use of the scanned work—the cost of such fees, 
as well as the cost of negotiating such permissions, would further 
add to the expense of creating the database. 
 
 31 See Copyright Act of 1909, § 23, available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/ 
1909act.pdf . 
 32 See Library of Congress Copyright Office, How to investigate the copyright status of 
a work, Circular 22 (2004), http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ22.pdf. 
 33 17 U.S.C. § 401, amended by The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-568 (Oct. 31, 1988). 
 34 See Copyright Act of 1909, § 1. 
 35 See Notice of Copyright, supra note 33. 
 36 See Proskine, supra note 8, at 219. 
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This scenario appears to threaten the prospect of an “anti-
commons” that might stifle the development of a comprehensive 
book database, whether compiled by Google or by anyone else.37  
Typically, property rights are allocated to prevent the so-called 
“tragedy of the commons,” where resources are misallocated 
because no one is motivated by ownership interests to maintain the 
resource.38  But an “anti-commons” can potentially occur in 
situations where permissions from multiple property holders are 
necessary to complete a project and where the transactions cost of 
obtaining such permissions becomes prohibitive—that is, where 
there are too many property rights and rights holders, rather than 
too few.39 
Google has attempted to solve this problem by moving ahead 
with the scanning of books, but giving publishers and authors the 
option of requesting that their work not be scanned into the 
database.40  This approach effectively shifts the burden of 
determining and asserting exclusive rights to copyright holders, 
requiring them to come forward and “opt out” of the project.41  
Copyright holders have complained that this approach 
impermissibly inverts the basic exclusivity premise of intellectual 
property: that copying is prohibited unless authorized.42  However, 
the Google “opt out” procedure operates from the premise that 
Google has the right to copy the works, but as a courtesy will 
refrain from doing so if asked.43  Much of the legal controversy to 
date over the Google “opt out” assertion has focused upon 
 
 37 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 661 (1998). 
 38 See id. at 677. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See What about books that I don’t want in Google Book Search at all?, Google Book 
Search Help Center, http://books.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=43755& 
topic=9011 (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).  Partners can upload a list of books to be excluded 
while others must participate in Google’s opt-out process. Id.; see also Library Exclusion 
List Upload Instructions, Google Book Search Help Center, 
http://books.google.com/support/partner/bin/answer.py?answer=44050 (last visited Jan. 
15, 2008); Library Project Exclusion Registration, https://books.google.com/partner/ 
exclusion-signup?hl=en_US (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
 41 See Band, supra note 12, at 12. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See id. at 14. 
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determining how Google could claim to be in a position to make 
copies without obtaining advance copyright permission.44 
The legal justification for Google’s opt-out position rests 
largely upon the American doctrine of fair use, a highly flexible, 
fact-specific exception to the rights of copyright holders.45  Most 
countries have within their copyright law a series of privileges and 
exceptions that allow the users of copyrighted works to engage in 
unauthorized activities that would otherwise violate the rights of 
the copyright owner: quoting a protected work for news reporting, 
reproducing a work for educational purpose, or certain other 
activities socially beneficial activities.46  But the United States, in 
addition to a list of such exceptions, also permits unauthorized uses 
on a case by case basis, depending upon the amount of protected 
expression taken, the type of work from which it is taken, the 
purpose to which it is put, and the effect of the unauthorized 
activity upon the market for the original work.47 
This U.S. exception to the exclusive rights of copyright holders 
has been explained by some commentators as a solution to the 
problem of high transaction costs.48  This theory of “fair use as 
market failure” argues that fair use is necessary when the 
transaction costs of reaching agreement on authorized use is too 
high—when the copyright owner cannot be easily found, or 
demands a fee in excess of the value of the use, or the negotiations 
are protracted and cumbersome, and so on.49  In such cases, the 
 
 44 See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Ruling May Undercut Google in Fight Over Its Book Scans, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/25/technology/ 
25google.html (speculating as to whether a relevant ruling against the creation of 
thumbails from copyrighted images undermines the legality of Google’s “opt-out” 
policy); see also Publishers Sue Google Over Plans To Digitize Books, Association of 
American Publishers (Oct. 19, 2005), http://publishers.org/main/PressCenter/Archicves/ 
2005_Oct/Oct_03.htm; Authors Guild Sues Google, Citing “Massive Copyright 
Infringement”, The Authors Guild (Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.authorsguild.org/ 
news/sues_google_citing.htm. 
 45 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2007). 
 46 See Band, supra note 12, at 14. 
 47 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 48 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis 
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1982); Lydia 
Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of 
Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997). 
 49 Gordon, supra note 48, at 1618; Loren, supra note 48, at 33 n.140. 
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law permits the user to circumvent the negotiation process and 
move ahead with the use, effectively taking a compulsory license 
at a zero royalty.50  Often this will occur in the case of minor, de 
minimis uses, where the value of the use is relatively low relative 
to the costs of search, negotiation, and so on.  But it could also 
occur when the value of the use is high and aggregate search costs 
are prohibitive, as in the anti-commons scenario.51 
Several U.S. cases have held that producing a temporary or 
intermediate copy, which is produced in the process of developing 
a product different than the copyrighted work, and which is then 
discarded, or at least which is not part of the product eventually 
marketed to the public, is a fair use.  For example, courts have 
repeatedly held that a copy of software made in the process of 
decompiling the software for reverse engineering, in order to 
produce an interoperable complimentary product, or even a 
competing product, is fair.52  The copy made is temporary—it is 
made in order to extract unprotected information about 
functionality, the result is a different product altogether, and the 
intermediate copy is not part of the product marketed to the 
public.53  A similar analysis has been applied to extracting public 
domain artworks from a copyrighted publication.54 
This same rationale might be applied to the Google Book 
Search database.  The scanned images are unnecessary to the final 
product—although images are being provided to the partner 
libraries, they can be discarded.  They are not the end product that 
is to be offered to the public; rather, they are a mechanism or 
vehicle for creating the end product, which is the searchable 
database.  The database is transformative, that is, it is not at all the 
 
 50 See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 133 
(1999). 
 51 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998); see also Burk, supra note 50, 
at 158 & n.185. 
 52 Samuelson, supra note 1, at 87–88 (discussing Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832 
(Fed. Cir. 1992), and MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computers, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 
1993)). 
 53 Samuelson, supra note 1, at 66. 
 54 Id. at 117–18. 
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same as, or a substitute for, the copyrighted works employed in its 
creation.55  What is being offered to the public is more than the 
sum of the scanned images—Google has added value by 
disaggregating and indexing the texts to make the relations 
between individual words searchable.  The database has value all 
its own, but its production would be impossible without the step of 
scanning the images.56 
At the same time, it might be argued that the market that is 
undermined by the use of the copyrighted works is the market for 
use of the works in databases.  This is in fact a source of complaint 
about paying for permission to use individual works in the creation 
of the database.57  Some previous copyright decisions suggest that 
in cases where a mechanism for licensing and payment of licensing 
royalties exists, the market potentially harmed by a fair use is the 
market for that particular use.58  This argument may be unavailing 
in the context of the Google project; previous cases relying on this 
rationale involve photocopying periodicals when payment for such 
photocopies could be made through an existing mechanism.  For 
example, cases holding that photocopying of materials for 
university course packets, or for archival reference, were based 
upon the existence of a mechanism for paying copy-licensing fees 
via the Copyright Clearance Center, which would distribute 
copying royalties to the owners of the works.59  But we have 
already seen that in the case of the Google project, many of the 
books to be scanned are “orphan” works for which the copyright 
status is uncertain, and the possible copyright owner unknown.  
Consequently, it is unclear whether development of an effective 
licensing and payment mechanism is possible. 
These considerations make Google’s fair use position at least 
tenable, and perhaps even decisive in the United States—but 
reliance on this U.S. doctrine has prompted Google to restrict Book 
 
 55 See Loren, supra note 48, at 30. 
 56 See Band, supra note 12, at 11. 
 57 Id. at 13. 
 58 See generally Loren, supra note 48, at 27–49 (analyzing recent case law). 
 59 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1381 (6th Cir. 
1996). 
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Search access to Internet users in the United States.60  Even with 
regard to U.S. law, such aspects of the Google project are 
fascinating and critically important.  But they have already 
received some treatment elsewhere, and are likely to be the subject 
of further analysis and critique.61  For the discussion here, they are 
necessary primarily as a backdrop to a different set of issues that 
are foregrounded in the Google project, but which are endemic to 
digital copyright.  Here I wish to focus upon the more fundamental 
and potentially far-reaching problem of ownership over metadata 
in digitized works. 
This analysis centers on the database that Google is building 
from the scanned texts, rather than the act of scanning images.  The 
database appears to consist of words and of metadata defining the 
relationship between those words.62  A given word will typically 
be too short to satisfy the requirements of originality and creativity 
for copyright;63 only creative expression that originates with an 
author is eligible for copyright protection.64  And even in the rare 
case where a word might qualify as original, it will likely fail 
copyright’s “merger” doctrine: fundamental to the law of copyright 
is the principle that it protects only original expression, and never 
the idea that is expressed.65  If there is only a single way, or very 
limited number of ways to express an idea, those expressive 
choices are excluded from copyright, since including them would 
be tantamount to protecting the idea itself.66 
Thus, as a matter of black-letter copyright law, it would appear 
that words are not protected by copyright, so no book publisher or 
author can claim copyright  infringement of individual words.67  
But more troubling is the status of the meta-database that records 
the relationship between those words.  The question I consider 
there, then, is whether Google has created an infringing copy of 
copyrighted books by building a database that allows 
 
 60 Band, supra note 12, at 14. 
 61 Id. at 14. 
 62 Proskine, supra note 8, at 217. 
 63 Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). 
 64 Feist Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 65 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 66 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 67 See id. 
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disaggregated words to be re-assembled into the text of those 
books. 
DEFINING DIGITAL COPIES 
The first question in determining whether Google’s database 
infringes the copyright in the scanned book texts is whether 
Google has made a copy for purposes of the copyright statute.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the first answer to this question of 
disaggregated copyrightable works was perhaps first apparent back 
to the beginning of the 20th Century, with the advent of automated 
player pianos, which played popular songs from paper rolls in 
which the music was coded as punched holes.68  Music composers 
objected that such piano rolls—precursors to the punch cards on 
which computer data was later stored—when made without their 
permission infringed the copyright in their musical compositions.69  
But the United States Supreme Court held that such piano rolls did 
not fall under the copyright statute, but were rather a piece of a 
machine that produced music, akin to a cog or toothed wheel in a 
music box.70  Machines and other functional devices are not 
covered by copyright; if covered by intellectual property law at all, 
they belong to the patent system.71  Consequently, the encoding of 
copyrighted music as punched holes was held not to constitute a 
violation of the copyright.72 
Congress responded to this decision, and to the ensuing distress 
of music composers, by creating a new category of copyrightable 
work, the phonorecord, intended to bring sound recordings within 
the Copyright Act.73  More important than player piano rolls, the 
category of phonorecords also encompassed the phonograph record 
in which sounds were recorded as grooves in vinyl discs—a 
critically important format for the distribution of popular music.74  
 
 68 See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1907). 
 69 Id. at 9–11. 
 70 Id. at 18. 
 71 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 72 White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18. 
 73 Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 31, at § 5. 
 74 See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 127 (2000). 
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In fact, this category of copyrightable fixation would eventually 
extend to encoding of music in a series of successive technological 
media: the magnetic flux of reel-to-reel, eight-track and cassette 
tapes, as well as the optical pits of compact discs.75  Since each of 
these formats, as well as other new media such as videotape, could 
be considered parts of a machine in the same sense as a player 
piano roll, Congress also amended the statutory definition of 
copies to include both those media “now known or later 
developed”76 from which the work could be perceived by a human 
being unaided, and from which perception of a work required the 
aid of a machine.77 
The media “later developed” to instantiate copyrightable works 
of course came to include digital media, perceived with the aid of a 
computer—the logical successors to the player piano roll.78  Coin-
operated video arcade games were among the earliest digitized 
works considered under this provision.  The popularity of these 
games during the 1970s and 1980s led to unauthorized “knock-
offs” of the most popular games, and to copyright suits against the 
copyists.79  Game developers had registered videotapes of the 
game displays with the federal Copyright Office as proof of 
ownership.  But copyists argued that registration of the game 
displays did not satisfy the requirements for copyright because the 
game output was not fixed in the circuits that generated the 
display—what was fixed was a computer program that produced 
the output, but the two were separable.80  As evidence that the 
display was unfixed, the copyists pointed out that the game display 
changed each time the game was played, in response to player 
input.  In a related argument, the copyists pointed out that no copy 
of the work was contained in the chips; rather, the work was 
generated or developed from instructions programmed into the 
chip.81  A variety of instructions or programs might produce the 
 
 75 Id. at 127. 
 76 Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 31, at § 26. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Burk, supra note 74, at 127. 
 79 See, e.g., Stern Elec. Co. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982); Williams 
Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 80 Stern, 669 F.2d at 855. 
 81 Williams, 685 F.2d at 877. 
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same output, and registration of the display should not entitle the 
copyright holder to every set of instructions producing such a 
display.82 
In cases such as Stern Electronics Co. v. Kaufman83 and 
Williams Electronics v. Artic International, Inc.,84 the courts 
rejected such arguments on the basis of the statutory definition, 
holding that if the work was fixed in the game’s semiconductor 
chip and could be perceived with the aid of a machine then it must 
be a statutory copy.  But under this holding, “perceive” must 
implicitly include generation or re-assembly of a work.  The 
pattern of voltages in a chip or the pattern of magnetic flux on a 
disc are both profoundly and subtly different from the grooves of a 
vinyl phonograph record.  Such analog recordings use one physical 
quantity to represent another.  Consequently, analog media 
maintain some relationship within the record of a work 
corresponding to the relationships within the work itself.  Digital 
records need not maintain such analogous relationships, but are 
instead series of sequences of bits that can be read to re-construct 
the work.85  While the digital version of the work is in some sense 
a record of the work, it is not a recording of the work as found in 
previous media. 
Thus, unlike a microform reader which simply amplifies 
human perception, computer code constitutes a set of instructions 
for generating the work perceived—but the courts held that 
perception of output implied existence of a digital copy.86  As a 
corollary, these cases also skirted the contested definitional lines 
between “data” and “software”—a sequence of bits containing the 
instructions to generate music or text, and a sequence of bits 
constituting the record of digitized music or text appear to be 
treated identically under these opinions.87  The Stern and Williams 
courts were likely less concerned with the technicalities of digital 
processing than they were with the end product of the process—an 
 
 82 Stern, 669 F.2d at 855. 
 83 Id. at 856. 
 84 Williams, 685 F.2d at 877. 
 85 Stern, 669 F.2d at 855–56; Williams, 685 F.2d at 874. 
 86 Stern, 669 F.2d at 857; Williams, 685 F.2d at 873–74. 
 87 Stern, 669 F.2d at 855; Williams, 685 F.2d at 871. 
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audiovisual work that, to all appearances, fell within copyright’s 
statutory subject matter—and with developing a plausible social 
policy for such end products.88  Consequently, these early gaming 
cases proved pivotal to establishing the copyrightability of 
computer programs, but their implications for storage of digital 
copies may not be consistent with more recent decisions, such as 
those discussed below. 
NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. TASINI 
The relationship between the arrangement of text in hardcopy 
materials and arrangement of digitized texts within a database was 
central to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in New 
York Times Co. v. Tasini.89  The Tasini case involved infringement 
claims by independently contracted or freelance writers who had 
licensed stories to a wide variety of periodical publications: 
newspapers and magazines including the New York Times, Time 
magazine, and Newsday.90  Many of these hardcopy periodicals 
had, since licensing or purchasing the freelance stories, begun 
making their contents available in searchable full-text electronic 
format.91  Some periodicals developed online databases, while 
others provided their contents on CD-ROM or similar electronic 
formats.92  Because the licenses or copyright transfers from the 
authors were executed before electronic versions of periodicals 
became common, the transfers did not address publication of the 
stories in databases or other electronic formats.93  Consequently, 
the authors claimed that inclusion of their stories in electronic 
formats was an unauthorized re-publication of their work, for 
which no rights had been granted to the periodical publishers.94 
In defense, the publishers relied upon § 201 of the copyright 
statute,95 which both establishes copyright in collective works and 
 
 88 Stern, 669 F.2d at 855; Williams, 685 F.2d at 877. 
 89 533 U.S. 483, 506 (2001). 
 90 Id. at 490. 
 91 See id. 
 92 See id. 
 93 See id. 
 94 See id. 
 95 Id. 
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distinguishes such copyright from that in the individual 
contributions to a collective work.96  Under this section of the 
statute, copyright may subsist in the original selection and 
arrangement of copyrighted works in a collective work, such as an 
anthology.97  This copyright in the collective work is separate and 
distinct from the copyright in any given work included in the 
collective work—copyright in the constituent works need not be 
transferred to the author or complier of a collective work.98  The 
holder of the collective work copyright is limited in the subsequent 
uses to which she may put the individual works comprising the 
collective work.99  Absent transfer of the copyright in the 
constituent works, the holder of the collective work copyright may 
use the constituent works only in a revision or re-issue of the initial 
collective work.100 
The publishers argued that the databases constituted a 
“revision” of the hardcopy periodical issues in which articles 
originally appeared, and that therefore the publishers had the right 
to include the articles in the database collections.101  But, this 
defense was rejected by the Supreme Court, which held that the 
periodical databases or electronic versions of the periodicals were 
not equivalent to the print versions.102  The Court reasoned that the 
articles in the databases had been disaggregated from their 
sequence and relationship in the print edition.103  Because the 
articles were no longer in the context of their original publication, 
but rather divorced of their print media relationships, the § 201 
revisioning privilege did not apply.104 
The Court rejected the contention that the electronic and CD 
databases contained the original periodicals despite the fact that 
articles retrieved in searches would display the pagination and 
publication markings of the periodical in which they were 
 
 96 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2000). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 485 (2001). 
 102 See id. at 484. 
 103 See id. at 486. 
 104 See id. 
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originally published.105  The Court held that such indicia were 
indicative of the article having previously appeared in the 
periodical, but were not indicative of the article as retrieved being 
part of the periodical.106  Rather, the articles were better thought of 
as components of a super-compendium or library consisting of all 
the disaggregated articles, and such a super-compendium was not 
equivalent to the original periodical.107  The Court specifically 
rejected an analogy to microform records, as microforms, unlike 
electronic databases, recorded the original sequence of the 
periodicals.108  The court also rejected the argument that because 
the users of the databases could re-assemble the articles into the 
original sequence, that the database was a revision of the original 
periodicals, anymore than a hardcopy library from which a patron 
could retrieve and re-assemble a periodical sequence would be a 
“revision” of those periodicals.109 
MATTHEW BENDER & CO. V. WEST PUBLISHING CO. 
A similar set of issues is found in copyright cases considering 
the protectability of relationships within the compiled text of 
volumes of judicial opinions.  The development of legal research 
databases from these opinions occasioned the disputes in such 
cases, when West Publishing Company attempted to prevent rival 
database publishers from adopting a standardized case citation 
format.110  West Publishing was and remains the major publisher 
of bound, hardcopy volumes of judicial reports, collecting the 
judicial opinions from essentially every jurisdiction in the United 
States.111  While some jurisdictions published their own reporters, 
in many instances the West reporter volumes were the only judicial 
reporters for certain jurisdictions. 
 
 105 See id. at 485. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See id. 
 108 See id. at 485–86. 
 109 See id. at 486. 
 110 See generally Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co. (West), 158 F.3d 693 (2d 
Cir. 1998). 
 111 Company Overview, Thompson West, http://west.thomson.com/overview (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Thompson West]. 
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Consequently, citation to the West reporter volumes became 
effectively an industry standard: anyone practicing in the legal 
profession used citations to the West bound hardcopy reports, not 
only in office documents and memoranda, but in official 
documents filed with the court system.112  Law students across the 
United States were trained to use West citations as an essential 
component of their professional preparation.113  Judicial opinions 
routinely used West citations.114  Indeed, many courts required 
attorneys practicing before them to use West citations in motions 
and briefs, and allowed the use of no other system, because the 
West reporter volumes were most commonly available to judges 
searching for, and citing to, judicial precedent.115 
With the advent of electronic storage and retrieval systems 
containing searchable, full text versions of judicial opinions, West 
transferred its reporter volume text to electronic format.116  West’s 
subscription database, Westlaw, used the “star pagination” system, 
which inserted into the electronic text of opinions numerical 
markers corresponding to the location of pages in the bound 
hardcopy reporter volumes.117  A rival legal publisher provided a 
competing product made up of judicial opinions on CD-ROM discs 
that could be accessed by a purchaser’s own machine, rather than 
via on-line database access.118  The text of these opinions on CD-
ROM included “star pagination” markers relating judicial opinion 
text to the published West reporter volumes—without such 
citations to the West volumes the electronic databases would be 
essentially useless to lawyers and other legal professionals.119 
However, West sued to prevent its competitors from using such 
pagination markers, arguing that appropriation of the star 
pagination citations was essentially appropriation of their 
published volumes—arguing, in other words, that such markers, 
indicating the position of text in the published volumes, mapped 
 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See West, 158 F.3d at 696. 
 115 See id. 
 116 See Thompson West, supra note 111. 
 117 See West, 158 F.3d at 695. 
 118 See id. 
 119 See id. 
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onto the published volume in such a way as to effectively 
constitute a copy of the hardcopy book.120  According to West, the 
CD-ROM discs comprised “copies” of the West reporter volumes 
because the selection and arrangement of cases in the West 
reporters could be perceived with the aid of a machine by use of 
the star pagination markers.121  In other words, by following the 
star pagination markers, a user could employ the automated 
functions of the CD-ROM to view or print cases in the same order 
found in the bound West reporter volumes, and this meant that the 
CD-ROMs contained copies of the West volumes.122  West also 
argued that the layout, selection, and arrangement of opinions in 
the published volumes constituted original, copyrighted 
expression.123  Hence, under this theory, use of “star pagination” 
markers constituted copying of the protected West volumes.124 
This citation infringement argument was striking because West 
advanced no argument that copying the content of the volumes was 
an infringement—it hardly could, because in the United States, by 
statute, federal government documents, including federal judicial 
opinions, cannot be copyrighted and lie in the public domain.125  
Many state government documents receive similar treatment, 
meaning that most of the text at issue in West’s claims was 
unquestionably unprotected by copyright.  Neither did they argue 
that the layout of the judicial opinion text was directly 
appropriated—formatting and layout was not captured in early 
electronic text databases, which was indeed what made the star 
pagination system of markers necessary.126  Rather, West’s 
argument was that citation that indicated the position of 
information—essentially what would come to be called 
metadata—was protected by their copyright.127 
 
 120 See id. at 695–96. 
 121 See id. 
 122 See id. 
 123 See id. at 700. 
 124 See id. 
 125 See id. at 698. 
 126 West claimed that Bender’s product allowed users to “to view (and print) judicial 
opinions in the same order in which they are printed in a West volume,” not that it copied 
West’s publications. Id. at 697. 
 127 “West’s alternative argument is that even though the page numbering is not (by 
itself) a protectable element of West’s compilation, (i) plaintiffs’ star pagination to 
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As an initial matter, the court declined to find any significant 
expression in the editing, selection, and arrangement of opinions in 
the West reporters—the court found that West chronologically 
published all the opinions made available, with only routine and 
minimal editing.128  The court rejected the copying argument, 
holding that offering the capability to re-generate the West 
volumes was not equivalent to offering copies of the West 
volumes.129  The sequence of page breaks signified by star 
pagination was not itself original, as it was created by a mechanical 
typesetting process, and not by any creative selection and 
arrangement of West’s.130 Moreover, even though star pagination 
markers might reveal to a reader how the West arrangement could 
be recreated, that arrangement was not fixed in the CD-ROM 
disc.131  Only manipulation of the data by a user would produce the 
West volume case sequence, and the products of user manipulation 
were copies fixed in the discs.132  Distinguishing the video game 
cases such as Stern,133 the court reasoned that adopting West’s 
argument regarding fixation would effectively extend West’s 
copyright to all arrangements or re-arrangements that could be 
generated by a user, and West was not entitled to control user-
generated arrangements.134 
MICRO STAR V. FORMGEN, INC. 
The copyright status of metadata descriptions has also been 
considered by the Ninth Circuit in Micro Star v. FormGen Inc.135  
 
West’s case reporters embeds West’s arrangement of cases in plaintiffs’ CD-ROM discs, 
thereby allowing a user to perceive West’s protected arrangement through the plaintiffs’ 
file-retrieval programs, and (ii) that under the Copyright Act’s definition of ‘copies,’ 17 
U.S.C. § 101, a work that allows the perception of a protectable element of a compilation 
through the aid of a machine amounts to a copy of the compilation.” Id. at 700. 
 128 See id. at 705. 
 129 See id. at 704. 
 130 See id. at 705. 
 131 See id. at 703. 
 132 See id. 
 133 See id. at 704; see generally Stern Elec. Co. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 
1982) (discussion supra). 
 134 See West, 158 F.3d at 703. 
 135 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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The dispute in that case centered on advanced playing levels for 
the computer game “Duke Nukem 3-D.”136  The game developer, 
FormGen, made available to its users the tools to develop alternate 
game levels and encouraged the sharing of such user-created game 
files on its web site.137  The advanced or alternate game versions 
existed as “MAP” files, or sets of game instructions, that could 
draw upon a graphic library of character and object images 
provided with the game itself, but which would sequence, arrange, 
and display the library images in such a way as to provide a more 
challenging game experience.138  In the opinion, the court 
compared such MAP files to “paint by number” instructions that 
tell where to place graphics from the library.139  The library of 
graphics itself was not traded or distributed with the MAP files; 
rather, it was part of the game purchased by users from 
FormGen.140  Thus, the MAP files operated together with other 
components with the Duke Nukem game, but could not themselves 
independently generate game output, lacking the necessary content 
to do so.141 
The defendant in the case, Micro Star, assembled on compact 
disc collections of the user-created files and marketed the disc 
without the authorization of either FormGen or of the users who 
developed the files.142  The user-created files, having been tacitly, 
if not explicitly, authorized by FormGen were presumably original 
works of authorship, for which the users would hold copyright and 
for which they might have a claim against Micro Star for 
infringing reproduction and distribution of the files.143  But suit 
was brought by FormGen, which had not created the files.144  This 
raised the question as to whether Micro Star had taken any of 
FormGen’s original expression.145  If none of FormGen’s 
 
 136 See id. at 1109. 
 137 Id. 
 138 See id. at 1110. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See id. 
 142 See id. at 1109. 
 143 See id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 See id. 
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expression were found in the files, FormGen had no infringement 
claim.146 
FormGen claimed that the taken MAP files constituted 
derivative works that contained protected expression, giving them 
standing to sue.147  In response, Micro Star argued that the copied 
and distributed MAP files failed the requirements of a derivative 
work, that they incorporated no protected expression, and did not 
constitute any concrete or permanent alteration to the FormGen’s 
original expression in the game.148  Micro Star’s arguments hinged 
upon the MAP files comprising only instructions for assembling an 
audiovisual display, without incorporating any of Formgen’s 
content.  The characters, objects, and other graphics of the game 
were contained in the separate game library that was not copied or 
distributed by Micro Star, and which was unaltered by the MAP 
files.149 
The appellate opinion authored by Judge Kozynski rejected this 
line of argument by reasoning somewhat circularly first, that the 
MAP files were permanent and concrete instantiation of a 
derivative work because they fully described an infringing 
audiovisual output.150  Analogizing the MAP files to sheet music, 
which Kozynski claimed similarly “describes” a musical 
composition, the court reasoned that a description of a derivative 
work is equivalent to a derivative work.151  The court further held 
that the MAP files incorporated protected expression as a sort of 
narrative; because the MAP files dictated the placement and 
sequence of the Duke Nukem characters, the MAP files therefore 
constituted a “story” about the FormGen game characters.152  
Relying on the early video game cases, Kozynski’s opinon reasons 
that the alternate game levels were derivative works of FormGen’s 
Duke Nukem story, and that by “describing” the placement and 
arrangement of the graphics in those derivative works, the MAP 
 
 146 See id. 
 147 Id. at 1110. 
 148 See id. at 1112. 
 149 See id. 
 150 Id. at 1111–12. 
 151 Id. at 1112. 
 152 See id. 
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files constituted in effect the plot, the sequence, and the narrative 
of those derivative works. 
The result in Micro Star might be read to imply that a relational 
database constitutes a copy of the work that it maps, since the court 
characterized the question presented as “whether an exact, down to 
the last detail, description of an audiovisual display” constituted a 
permanent fixation of a derivative work.153  Although this question 
is not exactly the question presented by the Google Book Search 
database, the questions are clearly closely related.  In Judge 
Kozynski’s words, the Google database comprises “an exact, down 
to the last detail description” of texts scanned into the database.154  
If instructions for re-arranging copyrighted elements into a 
derivative work constitute a permanent and concrete instantiation 
of the initial work, then instructions for re-assembling elements 
into the exact arrangement of a copyrighted work might be seen to 
constitute a copy of the initial work.155 
But it is unclear how far the logic of the opinion can be 
extended, as even on its own terms the logic of the opinion is more 
than a little dubious.  To begin with, the premise that the opinion 
relies upon is by definition flawed—the MAP files were not, as the 
court claimed, an exact description of an audiovisual display down 
to the last detail description; had they been, there would have been 
no need for the game graphics library.156  The MAP files were 
instructions on the placement and arrangement of data objects 
drawn from the graphics library, but those instructions would be 
agnostic as to exactly which images were so arranged.  One could 
imagine substituting a different graphics library, perhaps of Disney 
cartoon characters, or even caricatures of federal judges, for the 
FormGen graphics library.157  So long as the files in such graphic 
libraries were labeled with the same designators as those in the 
FormGen library, the images could be “called” in place of the 
Duke Nukem files, and a narrative devoid of any FormGen would 
 
 153 Id. at 1111–12. 
 154 Id. at 1111. 
 155 See id. at 1112. 
 156 See id. at 1111–12. 
 157 See generally id. at 1112. 
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be generated.158  The point is, of course, that the MAP files 
contained no distinctive “story” regarding Duke Nukem unless 
paired with the content of the FormGen graphics library. 
Kozynski’s comparison of the MAP files to sheet music, as 
instructions to produce a copyrighted work, fails for similar 
reasons.  Sheet music seldom offers a staff and time signature 
leaving the performer to fill in the actual notes to be played, nor for 
that matter does it merely offer instructions on how to assemble the 
score from a musical library such as “insert third note of the 
Mozart Requiem,” “insert twelfth note of the J.S. Bach Minuet in 
G,” and so on.159  Similarly, if the MAP files constituted detailed 
instructions about a derivative work, then it seems dubious that 
they could constitute a derivative work.  On Kozynski’s logic, a 
book of instructions on how to compose a book about Duke 
Nukem would itself qualify as a derivative work.160  The problem 
with this conclusion seems clear from the court’s comparison of 
MAP files to “paint by number” instructions—the result of 
painting by numbers might be infringing a copyrighted work, but it 
seems inconceivable that instructions such as “paint the spaces 
with the number 2 red” could be said to have copied any original 
expression from such work.161  Such instructions might perhaps 
constitute some sort of inducement to infringement, but that is 
another claim entirely. 
COPYRIGHT AND METADATA 
Although the Google project is novel in scope and vision, 
digitized works have been the subject of copyright controversy for 
well over a quarter century, so that previous cases offer some 
suggestion as to how Google’s meta-database should be 
regarded.162  The precedent that seems most relevant to the status 
of the Google database may appear to point in different 
 
 158 Id. 
 159 See id. 
 160 See id. 
 161 See id. at 1110. 
 162 See, e.g., id. at 1107. 
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directions.163  Taken on their own, the early videogame cases seem 
to suggest that the form of digital fixation is itself irrelevant: so 
long as the copyrighted work can be re-generated as output from 
the circuits of a machine, it doesn’t matter what kind of coding or 
instructions one would find at the machine level.164  This in turn 
seems to indicate that the set of instructions, or metadata, 
necessary to re-construct a copyrighted work itself constitutes an 
infringing copy of the work—that the metadata describing a work 
reproduces the originality in the work.  The Micro Star holding 
appears somewhat consistent with the results in the early 
videogame cases, although it also appears to be inconsistent with 
the results in Tasini and West.  An examination of the MAP files in 
Micro Star would not only fail to reveal the physical relational 
structure sought by the courts in Tasini and West, but would fail to 
find any representation whatsoever of the graphics displayed by 
the game output, as such graphics resided in the game library.165 
But careful consideration of the inapposite analogies in the 
Micro Star opinion also makes clear that this result is not 
altogether sensible and that instructions leading to a particular 
selection and arrangement are necessarily equivalent to selection 
and arrangement itself.166  Certainly this would not be the result if 
considering written instructions to a human, rather than coded 
instructions to a machine—if, for example, an art expert 
meticulously examined a famous painting and then wrote out 
detailed instructions re-creating the painting, brush stroke by brush 
stroke, it seems fairly clear that such instructions would not be 
considered to constitute a copy of the initial painting.167  The same 
would surely be true if the instructions were implemented by a 
machine; if a copyist developed a mechanical painting arm and 
programmed it to reproduce in fine detail the brush strokes of a 
painting, even if the product of the mechanical arm constituted a 
copy of the initial painting, the program instructing the movements 
of the mechanical arm would not be a copy.  Such instructions 
 
 163 See id. 
 164 See id. 
 165 See id.; N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). 
 166 See Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1111–12. 
 167 See id. at 1112. 
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might themselves warrant copyright protection, although that 
protection would likely be minimal, since the underlying process is 
excluded from copyright protection, and only whatever creativity 
might be found in the expression of the instructions could be 
covered by copyright.  But the copyright in the instructions would 
clearly not cover the result of following the instructions.168 
Other recent cases dealing with digitized hardcopy works tend 
to hold that when individual uncopyrightable elements of a 
copyrighted work are stored electronically so as to disrupt the 
relationship found between them in the original work, no copy has 
been made.169 Although decided in the context of a very specific 
statutory provision—§ 201—the reasoning in Tasini170 suggests 
that digital versions of hardcopy materials do not infringe 
copyright in the hardcopy text due to the disaggregation that occurs 
in digital storage and retrieval.171  Neither did the Supreme Court 
view user-initiated reassembly of the hardcopy sequence as 
infringement, due to the disaggregated nature of the database from 
which the user was working.  The presence of metadata sufficient 
to reassemble the original texts did not change this view.  This 
tends to suggest that neither the Google database of disaggregated 
book text nor the meta-database of book text relationships should 
be viewed as infringing copies of the books.172 
Much as in the Tasini decision, the analysis in West suggests 
that neither disaggregated digitized text nor relational metadata 
regarding that text constitute a copy of the original text for 
purposes of the copyright statute.173  But the reasoning in the West 
decision bears even more directly upon the Google situation, as 
this analysis is not through the lens of § 201 republication.  Unlike 
the databases in Tasini and West, the Google Book Search database 
does not maintain the works scanned into it as discrete retrievable 
 
 168 See id. at 1111–12. 
 169 See generally Tasini, 533 U.S. 483. 
 170 Id. 
 171 See id. at 503–04. 
 172 See id. at 504. 
 173 See Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publ’g Co. (West), 158 F.3d 693, 703–04 
(1998). 
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works, but atomizes them to the level of individual words.174  And 
far from assembling individually copyrightable images into what 
Judge Kozynski might consider “narrative,” the largest chunk 
available to the Google end user is a snippet of a few dozen 
words.175  Consequently, the Google database resembles its 
original texts even less than did the databases in Tasini and West, 
and seems even less likely to constitute and infringing copy. 
The analysis in these cases demarcates a general set of 
concerns for not only the Google project, but for digital copyright 
generally.  Although the law of copyright was developed in an 
analog world, creative works of all kinds are now captured as 
series of sequences of bits rather than as analog records.176  This 
change in the fixation of works has several consequences that are 
problematic for the basic doctrines of copyright.177  Most of these 
consequences flow from the fungible nature of bits.  Previous 
analog media typically encoded different types of works in 
different formats—motion pictures were not recorded as grooves in 
vinyl; musical compositions were not recorded as grains of silver 
nitrate on celluloid.  But digitized music or software or text are all 
just sequences of bits, not anything that can as encoded be 
differentiated as pictures or music or text.178  Data processors make 
no distinction between bits that represent a photograph or painting 
or a piece of music or a piece of text, or for that matter between 
bits representing a copyrightable work and bits representing 
something uncopyrightable, such as a Fourier transform series.179 
Because digital records use this common building block of the 
bit, it is possible to arrange that common building block into all 
kinds of copyrightable works.  In this sense, digital media turns 
everything—all kinds of copyrightable works—into databases, into 
 
 174 See How does Google Book Search work?, Google Book Search Help Center, 
http://books.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=43724&topic=9259 (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2008). 
 175 See id. 
 176 See Dan L. Burk, Expression, Selection, Abstraction: Copyright’s Golden Braid, 55 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 593, 594 (2005). 
 177 See id. 
 178 See id. at 611. 
 179 See id. 
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compilations of fungible elements.180  Everything is reducible to 
discrete elements, none of which are individually original.181  This 
in turn means that there must necessarily be some type of 
metadata, some type of organizational instruction, as to the manner 
in which the bits are to be reassembled.182  And it is at this level 
that the original expression necessary for copyright protection must 
reside, in the manner in which the bits have been arranged to 
encode music or text or graphics.183  There is nothing original in 
any of the individual bits that can be read to constitute a 
photograph or text or musical composition.  The originality lies not 
in the components, the bits of information, but in the way that the 
bits of information are arranged 
Such atomistic reduction of copyrighted works to fungible 
units may not necessarily be the product of digital technologies; 
previous media show the same characteristics to some degree.184  
For example, it is possible to view print media as an arrangement 
of individual letters from the alphabet into words, and at the next 
level of organization, as an arrangement of individual words into a 
novel, play, or poem.  This reductionist view presents the same 
doctrinal problem: surely the letter “A” is not of itself protectable 
in copyright, nor is the letter “B,” nor are individual words.185  The 
only original aspect of the work must be the author’s selection and 
arrangement of the words and letters.  The same is true in the case 
of other copyrightable works, such as a musical composition or an 
Impressionist painting.  No individual dab of paint or musical note 
will entail the requisite originality for copyright.  Rather, the 
arrangement of the dabs of paint, the arrangement of individual 
notes, structured to communicate a particular idea, is original. 
Thus, the essence of copyright seems to lie in original selection 
and arrangement of fungible elements.186  Digitization makes this 
result more apparent because it facilitates the disaggregation of 
 
 180 See id. 
 181 See id. 
 182 See id. 
 183 See id. 
 184 See id. at 612. 
 185 See id. 
 186 See id. 
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individual elements.187  Although this principle could be applied to 
previous analog or physical types of media, it was largely a matter 
of academic or philosophical speculation—an exercise in 
determining how many works of original authorship could dance 
on the head of a pin.  But the issue is now unavoidable, and therein 
lies the paradox for copyright doctrine: copyrightable selection and 
arrangement cannot exist in a vacuum; there must be selection and 
arrangement of something.188  This seems to be the message of the 
Tasini and West decisions.  Relational metadata, as generated in 
Tasini or West or in the Google Book Search database, is a 
description of the selection and arrangement of atomistic elements 
in the work described, but cannot itself be a copy of the work, 
because the metadata does not incorporate the atomized elements 
of the work.189 
This is presumably good news for the Google project, as it 
argues powerfully against its disaggregated textual database 
constituting an infringing copy, quite apart from an analysis of fair 
use.  But this reductionist conclusion also in some sense places 
copyright doctrine on a collision course with itself.  If no 
individual bit of data warrants copyright protection, and the 
metadata used to arrange such bits also fails the criteria for 
copyright, then it is unclear which digital content might warrant 
copyright protection.  Indeed, this outcome implies that the Google 
metadatabase itself, for all the investment that has gone into it, is 
no more eligible for copyright protection than any other digital 
work in the database of databases that comprises the emerging 
global information structure. 
 
 187 See id. 
 188 See id. at 612–13. 
 189 See id. at 613. 
